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ON! F ecnnnniists estimate that 5 percent or r)ir)rt
of all farms ct.u’r’entlv in business will go into bank—
r’uptcv in I 986, and that one farm in seven will fail
within the next four year’s. A recent study In’ two
agricultural economists estima tes tI at far’rii le r)clers
may write oft’ as much as $50 billion in bad far-mdebt
over the next four year’s, with S2t) billion cited as the
‘‘most pr’obable loss estimate!
Such projections of losses on farm loans may be
high Nevertheless actual losses to date already have
been large enough to cause a substantial increase ii)
the failui-e ‘ate among agricultural banks Accotinting
for 22 percent of bank failures between) 1981 and 1983,
agricultural banks have made up about two—thirds ol
all failed banks since iul~’1984’, 62 agricultural banks
failed during 1985.’ Moreover’, the l”ar’m Credit System,
a group of feder’aflv sponsored agencies that lends to
farmer’s, announced this fall that it will need direct
assistance fr-om the federal governntent to stay ii)
operation!
Ordinarily, the failur-e of some farmer-s and some
far-m lenders need not attract more attention than we
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‘Schink and Urbanchuk (1985), Drabenstott and Duncan (1985), and
“The Farm Slide” (1985).
‘Schink and Urbanchuk,
‘Agricultural banks are identified asthose with a ratio of farm loans to
total loans above the national average for all commercial banks,
This average is currently 17 percent.
‘Karr and McCoy(1985). For a discussion of the financial condition of
farm lenders, seeBelongia and Carraro (1985).
cur-r’entlv pay to the thousands of business fir’rirs that
fail each ~‘ear’.’l”or several reasons, Itowever’, the cr,r r’—
rent farm debt situation has attracted special atten-
tion, First, projections of’ lar-ge losses concentrated in
agriculture have cr-eated concern about tire ec000riirc
health of the entire industry. Moreover’, the farm cr-edit
crisis has develo ied at a time wIie I) Ioarr losses of
commercial banks alr’ead~’ are relatively high. Finally,
the appar’ent vulner-ability ofthe banking system to the
far-ni credit crisis has increased prrblic concern abotrt
the continued viability of many banks that have beer)
heavily committed to agr’icultrrr’al leriding.
Some economists lur’tlier’ believe that problems it)
the far-rn sector nil I spill over into the rest ol the
economy, causing slower economic gr-on’tl) and lower
emplovme rit. One recent st I r lv suggested that bank
failures resulting from losses on farm loans could
cause investor’s to view iuvestnrents in all privately
issued securities as uior’e risky,” Consequently, inter’—
est r-ates on all privately issued securities cor,rld rise
relativeto the interest rates on V.S.’l’r’easurvsecurities,
causing a slowing in economic gr’owtl). ‘l’his article
discusses reasons for thinking that this effect either
will not occur’ or will be relatively insignificant and/or
sbort-’lived.
‘From 1979 through 1984, an average ot 20.000 business firms
failed each year. U.S. Department of Commerce (1985).
‘Schink and Urbanchuk. In particular, the Wharton study indicates
wider spreads between the commercial paper rate and the three-
month Treasury bill rate. A related study by Chase Econometrics
(1985) deals with the more narrowquestion ot a default by the Farm
Credit System on its bonds, its study shows even more substan-
tial spitlover effects, with private debt interest rates rising by 300—
400 basis points over rates on government debt.
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chart 1
Farm Land Values and Farm Debt
tfthe failure of lan-ge numbers of far-ms~~~ffectsboth
interest rates and general economic activity adversely,
then assisting the agricultur’al sector of the economy
may make sense oven- and above the usual r-ationale
based on the social benefits of maintaining the family
farm. The magnitude of federal aid necessary to keep
far-rn lender’s viable, howeyer, has been estimated to be
in the “multi-billions” of dollars for the Fartl) Credit
System alone. In light of current efforts to reduce the
feden’al budget deficit, it seems pn-udent to assess the
likelihood that tile current financial problems of the
farm sectorwill affect the whole economy adversely.
‘ibis article analyzes the influences of the curr-ent
farm credit cr-isis on the economy in two ways. ‘l’he
first approach examines the performance of financial
otar’ket S and tIte econonw in r-ecent year’s, Since the
financial trouble of farmer-s became nodes pread afier
theaverage price of farmland started declirlirlg in) 1981,
we 0) iglit expect to observe some adverse effects or~
the economy already. ‘t’be second approach examines
the effects of the far-m financial crisis of the 1920s (ill
be economic actiyit~’ of that per-iod
‘l’i’iF OEU.GI.N A~J I) EFFFCFS OF 11’IW’
(AjRREr’ I FARM CHLIJfl CRISIS
‘l’oday’s farm crisis developed as ar’esult oftIle r’apid
increases in the prices of far-mlan’rd in the 1970s
tllr-ougb 1981 and the subsequent declines in land
prices since then. The 1970s and early 1980s wer-e
year’s of rapid inflation. l-’r’om 1972 thr-ortgh 1981, the
GNP deflatorrose atan 8.1 percent average annual rate
while tIle C Pt rose at a 9 per-cent aver-age rate. ‘I’he
price of far-mnlarid rose even ninor-e rapidly: theaverage
price of an acre of farm real estate rose at a 14.4
I er’cent annual rate from 1972 thm-or.ngb 1981
Cbar 1 indicates that total farm debt rose in step
with the rise in the pr-ices of farn’nland. ,Movements in)
‘Between 1972 and 1981, the price of farmland increased at an
average annual rate of 14.4 percent, while, over the same period,
total farm debt increased at a 13.5 percent average annual rate.
Index, 1972 1.0
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Chart 2







Ia nd pores and fat’m debt over this period were
closely related for two r-easons : First, many far-mers
who bought land while land pr’ices were rising hor’—
‘owed heavily to finance their purchases. Second, the
rising land prices enabled farmers to pledge their land
as collateral forgenen al purpose loans.
Unfortunately for’farmer’s, prices of farm commodi-
ties did not r’ise as fast as farmland prices chart 21.
From 1972 thn’ough 1981,an index of prices received by
farmers on all fan-ni) pn’oducts rose at an 8.1 percent
rate, equal to the general inflation r’ate. Furthen’mon-e,
most of the rise in the index of farm prices oven’ these
yearswas concentrated in 1973—74 and 1978—79. Prices
r’eceived by farmers have not risen as rapidly as the
GNU deflator since 1979. Thus, during the years of
rapid inflation,the price offarmland rosesubstantially
faster than the prices received by farmers for- their
output.
The general r-ate of inflation slowed sharply after
1981, making farniland ownership less valuable as an
inflation hedge. In) addition, the price of farm output
relatiye to nonfarm prices has declined In’ 1.8 percent
since 1981. For many farmer’s who hon-rowed heavily
during the penod of rapid incr’eases in the price of
farmland, prices received for tar’n)i products have not
heel) high enough to cover their operating expenses
and meet their’ loan pavments. Consequerit lv, faror
lenders have begun incurr’nng losses on~the loans on
which farmers have defar,tlted and the protection of
collater’al for farm lenders has been eroded by fallirlg
farmland pr-nces.
Onh’ ~tMimn’itr oj.Fan:wr’s flare
Peso sit Oil Problems
The data in table 1 show that the ‘‘far’n’r credit crisis
is concentrated primitr’il among a minority of the
family—size commercial farms, which have annual
Index, 1912 1.0
Annual Data Index, 1912 = 1.0
4.0
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sales of farm out put het\veent 850.001) and S500,000.~
About two—thir’ds of’ the family—size rurrtnier’rial farms
have ratios of’ debt to assels helow 40 percent: the
tSD1\ consider-s these farms to have no apparent
financial problems. \loneuven. these far’ruts acrocrnt for’
less than 31) percent of the debt held b~’ ujediurn—size
farms, in contn-ast. about 14 percent of family—size
commercial farms have debt—lu—assets ratios of7O per’—
cent or’ higher’, and these account fun’ over’ 30 pe’rent
of’ the debt. In) total about our—third of fanrtily—size
8Farms with less than $50,000 in annual sales tend to be parf’time
operations for the farmers: for these farms, there are nonfarm
sources of income available to meet the debt payments. In contrast,
many of the farms with annual sales over 5500,000 are specralty
operations, like cattle feedlots and poultry farms, which haveoper-
ated profitably with high debt-to-assets ratios for many years. Farms
with relatively large annual sales tend to be more profitable than
smaller farms,
Only 1 percent of all farms have sales in excess of $500,000 but
they account for more than 60 percent of farm income. In contrast,
the group of farmswith less than $40000 in annual sales actually
shows a loss equal to 6.5 percent of farm income.
In comparing farms that sell between $40,000 and $500,000 of
product annually with those selling more than $500,000, the larger
farms have an income-to-equity ratio of 16.5 and an income-to~debt
ratio of 28.6 vs. figures of 3.3 and 11.9, respectively. for the smaller
category of commercial~size farms. For more detail on holdings of
farm debt by size of larm and alternativeestimates of the number of
farms in serious financial trouble, see Bullock (1985).
commercial farms hold mor’e than 70 per-ce,nI of this
farm rategorvs debt and have debt —to—assets ratios
that indicate some financial st tess. It is this minority of
farmer’s — and their’ Iendem-s — who acrount fur’ the
pr-uhleru debt.
‘l’he spr-etd hetn’eerr the intenes I rates on connmer’—
cial paper’ and’t’r-casn.rrv hills —— one treasure of the
spread between interest n’ates on private ar’rcl ptnhlir
debt — appear’s to r’eflect a r’isk pentium on privately
isstjed debt, Of the year’scover-ed in chart 3, the spread
was largest fn’om 1980 through 1982, essentially one
cur’rtintluus period of economic recession.’’ his ‘ate
spnincl alsowidened fona few mouths around the tune
of’ the financial crisis at the Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank in May 1984, perhaps reflecting investurs
concern about the pussi )le consequences of failrrr’e h_v
Continental Illinois,
‘l’her’e is little evidence, however, that the growing
farm credit crisis since 1981 has had adverse etfects or)
the economy. Real economic activity has been rising
since late 1982. \Iur’euver’, the spread between the
commercial pirpen’rate and rhe ‘l’r’easury hill rate gm—
en’ali~’has in;rrrou’td lulluwing the sharp rise in tire
Cnlun’e nateau)ong agr’icultur’al banks that began in) the
second half of 1984 chant 31, In fact, since mid—1984.
the spread hetweer) inten-est n’ates on private and ptnh—
lie debt instn’umentts oh similar’ maturity has brent as
low as at any per’rud since 1978, ‘l’hus, ~vhile this ‘ate
spread reflects a nisk pm-erttiunl). the risk premium clues
nut appeal’ to be significantly correlated with pn’ob—
lenis in) agriculture as suggested by srtndies warning of
a general financial crisis,
EcJ.IN(J%IIC EFFE.C1.’S (~)I~ ‘ii•Ii~I2%Ii•%i
F.l.NA.NCIAl~CRISIS IN TIlE l.820s
Since history fn’equentlv r’epeats itself. we may learn
sou)etl’ning In’ looking hack to similar’ pn’uhlernts in an
manlier’ era, ‘lbeagn’icultun’al sector’ of tIne t.S. eeurlumy
exper’ienced a financial crisis during the l920s that
was similar’ in many rvspecls to far’mnen-s’ and tan’m
lenclc’n’s’ cun’n’ent financial pn-ohlems. ‘lu make Ibis cx—
pcn’ience n’elevant fun’ an) analysis of the l980s, we fir-st
‘The average spread between 1975 and 1980 was 52 basis points.
This wrdened to an average of 140 basis points between 1980 and
1982. Since the beginning of 1983. the average commercial paper-
Treasury bill rate spread has been 40 basis points, with a high of 95
basis points in June 1984 and a low of 7 basis points in July and
August 1983.
Table 1
Distribution of Family-Size Commercial
Farms by Their Ratio of Debt to Assets,
January 1985
Natureof flatragt Percentage Percentageof debt
flrramzai debtlb of ofalt familysize
condrtion assets farms commercratfarms
lecher ally
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ntust examine some of the important simifar-ities and
differ-ertees between the far-tn crises of the 1920s and
1980s.
t cs. Aqrieu.lture In’.Jhre World War .1
Agricultu t’e accounted for’ mt.rel) larger shares of
employment and output in the U.S. economy before
Won-id War I tbar) in the 1980s. “‘ In 1 90t), fur’ example,
about 41 percent of total employment was in) the farm
sector’, ‘l’be share of the lahor’ force on farms was
declining, falling to just under’ 30 pen’rent by 1913. In)
contrast, the far-n) sector’ accounted for’only 3 percent
of ci~ilianemployment in 1981, the year’ of the recent
peak ir’t farmland pr-ices.
tJr.rr-ingthefiveyears ending in 1901, the dollar’value
of farm otitput accounted for’ 23.5 percent of gross
IC.Data used in this discussion are taken from the U.S. Department of
Commerce (1975).
pr’i\’ate domestic pr-odun.:t . liv the fh’e veal-s ending in
1921, that percentage declined to 14.5 percent. In
contrast, farm utttput accounted tot’ ahuut :i pen’cent of
gross pr-ivate domestic product in 1981 . ‘ihese t.:un—
trasts suggest that ad~’er’sedleyeIopmmnts in the far-rn
sector should have had larger effects on the economy
before World War I tItan in the 1980s,
‘She far-rn sector was the major expot’t sector of the
1.1,5, economy hefom’c the war-, with fart)) exports ac-
counting fun’ 65 pen’cd~ntof the dollar value uf all t .5,
expor-ts ir) 1901. That shar-e uf total exports declined
gradualI~’to 46 per-cent in 19 t3, inn t rose again tu 48
percent it) 1920, In) 1981 , agn’icultur’al pi’oclucts ac—
cotrnted fur’ 18.6 per’cent of U.S. nwr’chandise exports.
rl~heGrowing Importance of Credit fin’
4grtcniture
Sever-al developments made the a”aihahilit’v ofcredit
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Table 2
Farm Mortgage Debt and Its Distribution Among Lenders: 191 0-29
Percentage held by -
Joint-
Total debt Federal stock Lite Individuals
(millions Land land insurance Commercial and
Year -- of dollars) Banks banks companies - banks others
910 53207 120’.~ ‘27’~ 753~,-
‘913 4347 2/ i~5 719
1915 4990 34 iSO 716
19’S 6~tIS6 06-: 46 1o4 b93
1920 d448 35 15 143 700
1925 9917 45 196 121 545
th29 9.756 ‘21 Ii? 7l9 107 485
Less tar 0 pe:cc’r I
Soarce US Deca’ln-ert of cnnr’ne’ce tl97~r
had beer) earlier’ in U.S. history. tn the ear-h’ ISOOs,
homesteader’s could ohtain land and hecome fat-met’s
relatively cbeaplv: by the late I SODs, new farmer’s had
to buy land fr’om other’ landownet-s, Farming also
became motecapital—intensive as specialized machin-
ery and buildings made fan-n) oper-ations more
efficient,
Prior’ to Won’ld War t, farm mortgage cr-edit was
available fr-on) c,omnwr’cial hanks, life insurance coot—
panics, indi\’Rh~’r~tls, and other’s Itable 21, The categon’
ot ‘‘indn’tduals and other’s,’’ which accounted for 75
percent of farm mortgage credit in 1910, inclrrded the
harm mortgage loan con)panies that began oper-ating
it) the late 1800s. Mortgage loat~companies genetitil~
were funded by investor’s in the eastern states, These
companies employed agents who worked in farm
comrnutiities, accepted mortgage loan applications
from farmer’s and tr’ansn’titted the loan applications to
the mor-tgage companies for appr’oval.’’
Most farm mortgage loans had maturities of thr’ee to
fiveyears.: Maturities of farm mortgage loans tended
to he shor’test at commercial banks; about half of these
loans had maturities of one year or less.” Shorter loan
“Eichengreen (1984) and Olsen (1925).
“Farmers did not like the terms on which mortgage credit was made
available to them, They considered the interest rates on tarm
mortgage loans to be too high. Many farmers also considered the
maturity offarm mortgage loans to be too short. See Eichengreen,
Higgs (1971), and Stock (1984).
“Olsen, pp. 208—19.
matt.rnties made tarmer’s r’not’e vulner’ahle to (‘or-edo—
sure by creditor’s, Although a f’ar’mer experiencing
temporan’ financial distress orchnar-ily might he able
to meet the payments on an outstanding nl)ortgage
loan, lenders might not r-enew the moi-tgage loan if it
matured while a far-mer was having a financial
problem.
Farmers tur-nedtheir complaints ahout the terms of
credit available to them into an intpor’tant political
issue bythe early 1900s, Political initiatives by farmer’s
resulted in the passage ofthe F’eder-al l-’an’m Loan Act of
1916, which estahlished the F’an’m Cr’edit Ranks under
the owner-ship and supervision of the feden-al govern-
ment, That act also facilitated the development of
joint—stock land banks, which were privately owned
and managed fir’ms that operated under’ the supern—
sion of the federal gover-nment. l’bese two categories
of federally supervised lending instittrtions made
most oftheirfarm mor’tgage loans with maturities of33
to 35 year’s.’ i’ahle 2 indicates that the Federal Land
Banks and the joint—stock land banks did not become
major farm lenders until the 1920s.
World War tand the Edrin Finsmchl
Crisis of the 1920s
The farm financial crisis of the 1920s resulted f’rom
the response of the U.S. agricultur’al sector to the
disruption to agricirltun-al production that occurred in
Western Eut-ope dur-ir’tg World War’ I. The nations of
“Olsen, p.215.
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Chart 4











Westet-o Eur-ope inur-eased their’ agricultur-al irnpor’ts
to replace lost pr’oduo;tion. This caused the dollar
value of U.S. far’m exports to rise shan’plv during the
war and shor-tly thereafter char-t 41. Prices of farm
products and far-mIamI rose sharply during these pe—
nod5 in response to the increase in foreign demand
for [IS. farm products.
Farmers borrowed substantially during the war’ to
buy land that was rising r’apidlv in value and to) spend
more on non—land inpr.rts toexpand production. [ann
mortgage debt increased from 54.7 billior) on ,fanuarv
1, 1914, to 510.2 hilliun on january 1, 192 t . Non-real-
estate farm loans at cornrnet’cial banks rose fr-on) 51.6
billion to S3.9 billion over the same period.
U.S. farm exports declined after’ the war-, as far-rims in
Western Europe r’esrrmedl production Idhar’t 41, The
decline in export demand for t.I,S, farm pr’oolucts con-
trrhuted to areduction it) farm prices r-elative to prices
of industrial commodities. This n-atio of far-mi) to) non—
farm prices peaked it) 1920, them) declined sharph’ in
1921 chart SI, l’be.aver’age pr-ice of far-mland contin—
tied to rise through 1920, then declined it) each subse—
qirent ear thr-ough 1928 Ichar’t UI,
Declines in the prices of farm output and the value
of farmland drove mans’ farmer’s into) bankruptcy anol
mans’ agricultural banks into failure, Finn) t921 to)
1929, an aver-age of 635 banks failed per year’, con~~—
pared with an average of 88 bank failur-es per ~‘earo~’er
the prenous 20 years.
Charts 5 and 6 dompar’e the declines it) pr-ices of
farm commodities and land it) the I 920s with those of
the 1950s. These compam-tsons show declines much
more severe than what has beet) observed so fan’ in the
1950s. F’irst, the relative price of farm output declined
more in the 1920s than in the 1980s Ichart SI. Second,
there were sharper declines in far’mland prices~the
collateral base for far-m debt after 1920 than after’ 1981
chart Si. Other things equal, these declines would
have had nruch gr’eater’effects on the ability of farmers
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the 1920s. Finally, with shorter matirr’ities on most of
the farm mnoir’tgage credit it) the 1920s, the declines in
farm prices and land values made farmer’s mor-e vul-
nerable to foreclostrr’e then than now.
cnnnmic ./1.f~jn~si;nenis if• lit. .Fär,n
}:j1.sg.11~j0j (]rcis’ o/tht~i .1 920s:
Jniplieaiiur s/in’ the lS8Us
As noteol pr’evioush’, agr icmlt mtr-e‘s larger share of
total otrtpt.tt in the I 920s implies that problems it) the
Ia in sector would have had larger’ ad~’er’seeffects on
UN P and emplon’ment in the t920s tham’r in the 1980s.
Yet the 1920s veto’. year’s of gener-al economic pr-osper-—
ity. Real UNP noise at a 4.2 per’cet)t ant)mral r’ate fr-on)
1920 through 1929. up front an average of 3 percent
at)0 ual gt-owth over’ the prior 20 \‘eans. ‘l’he riu0)her’ of
persons employed grew at a 1 .8 p er’cent rate frome 1920
thn’oirgh 1929, about the same, rate as over’ the prior 20
year’s Although general economic growth might have
been e\’en stronger- without agr’icultmtr’e’s problems,
the actual economic pemi’o 1nanc.e cer-tain lv rIreets or
exceeols most historical rioir’ms.
Declines in the prices of far-moutprt and farmland
in the 1920s also had relatively small effects or) eco-
nomic activit~’in the farm sector, Although far-ri) out—
port fell sharply in 1921, the index of oiier’all farm
outport had regained its pr’e~iouspeak ti~’1925. l”arm
omrtp ott rose at a 1.4 per’cent annual rate fr-om 1925
l’rt’ough 1929, while teal UNP r-oseat a 3.2 percent rate.
‘l’otal emplovnient in the far’m sector essentialh’ was
ut-rchanged ir’r the t920s ; the growth of emplovn)ent
occur-n-ed in the nonfar’mu sector-.
1 low could such a sevent, deflation in the far’r’n scc—
ton’, with widespread farm liankr’uptcies, Irave such
small effects on farm oiutput? ‘l’he answer involves tIm
process of bankruptcy it) mm’ capitalistic economic
svsten’n . When lan’men’s go hantkn’upt, their land and
equipment do tiot go out of pr’oduction; these n’e—
sot.rr-ces instead ar-c sold to other farmer-s at reduced
prices. It is the lower prices that make it pr’ofItable for
other farmer’s to Iiuv the land and equipment even
though prices for’ fan’m output are lower’, ‘l’hus.
h r’oirgl tt he process of bar tkr’orptc\’~Iar’m assets are
r’epr’iced to levels low enomrgh to make their continued
mrse lin’olitable for farmer’s.
Finally, if higher’ harik failinre r-ates camrse an increase
in risk lit’ tmiums on privately issmred rleht . this effect
also should have heel) stronger in the I920s that) it)
the 1980s, especially since federal deposit instrr’ance
olid ntot exist then. Despite the large numlier’ of bank
failur’es during the I920s, however’, the spread be—
tweer t the cornmencial pa~ ier’ ‘ate and the \‘ield or)
short—term ‘l’n’easrrr’ secotr’ities olid nut widen durmg
that decaole chart 71.‘‘‘I’bus, tie financial distr-ess in
the agr’icttltir ‘al sector oifthe economy did not seem to)
produce an mm-ease in risk premiums on pnn’atelv
issued delit.
lntht.’idual Bank fl:tiliires vs. the
Liquidity uij’the Bankiny System
‘the pniman’ r’eason that the bank failures had sorch
little influence on over’all economic activity in the
1920s was that the rnoriev supply grew fast enoiugh to
smrppoir’t growth in economic acti~it~’ and to fo ‘esfall
liquidity pr’olilenns in the banking system as a whoile.
Deposits in) the many failed banks were simply tratis—
fen’r’eol to solvent banks. “ith rio oven-all r’edmtctirin in
the rnorrev stock, Becaorse the quantity of money is
cIoselv r’elateol to aggr’egate spending and economic
activity, the gr’owlh in the morne\’ stock facilitaled
growth in overall ecoinioo)ic acti~itv Ichar-t Si. Althoiugh
the money supply dr’opped sharply in 192 t , olornirig a
recession after’ \Vorlol War I, XII Idemand oleposits
lilus cirn’rencv 1 r’oise at aliomtt a 3 per’cent anti oral ‘ate
froimjt.tne 1921 through .lmtne 1929. ‘l’his incr-ease facili-
tated the economic gr’owth that occurred over that
period, in sharp cointr’ast to the beginning oif the Un-eat
Depression 1930—33], which saw the rnone\’ stock
decline at an 11 per-cent annual r’ate IcItart Si,’”
coNcLUSIorhjS
Many farmer’s with high r’atios of debt to assets wrIl
goi hankr-upt unless the~’receive large gover’nmenl
subsidies, Some ecoir’ioimnists have war-ned that rising
far’m hankr-mrptcies will cause the faihr re of mans’ lar’ri.n
lianks and prissiblv the Farm Cn’edit System. Other-s
even have suggested that far’m loan losses are likely to
pt-odotceagenuine financial crisis unless federal aid is
pr’ovided.
‘the endence presented ir this ariicle does not
support the argument that the far-rn financial crisis
~~‘illadver-selv affect the entire ecoinornv. ‘l’he financial
problems of many far-men’s have become senoons since
1981 primarily hecamtse the aver-age pn’ice of far-mland
has declined, ‘tim floattcial problems offarmers, how—
even-, have noit increased the n-dative in ter’est mates on
“The average spread in the 1 920s was 127 basis points. The lowest
and highest average spreads were 73 basis points in 1928 and 231
basis points in 1920.
‘~Fora detailed analysis of how declines in the money stock were
related to the Great Depression, see Friedman and Schwartz
(1963).
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all pn’ivafclv issued delit or- slowed tIm gm’owth of total
output. Evidence from the 1920s,a pen-iod of similar
crisis in the far-mn sector-, indicates that the farm finan-
cial crisis of that decade also had rioadverse effects tin
the interest rates on privatclvissued detit or-on over-all
economic growth. If we want to nationalize govern-
tnent support for farmers with high debt-to-assets
ratios, such support should be sought on other
grounds.
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